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I. INTRODUCTION 
When we send fine young Americans into harm's way, we have a 
moral and legal obligation to provide them with Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) 1 that protect their right of self-defense. Our soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and Marines must expect ROE that, to the maximum extent 
possible under the mission parameters, best ensure their safe return. 
Indeed, this is the stated policy of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff's Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE).2 The SROE, however, 
are silent concerning the ultimate and maximum exercise of self-de-
fense - the use of deadly force. 3 Simply stated, the SROE fail to an-
swer clearly and unequivocally the foremost question of those at the 
tip of the spear: When can I pull the trigger? 
Silence regarding the use of deadly force at the strategic level has 
resulted in the confusing and potentially life-threatening absence of 
operationally specific guidance at the tactical level. 4 As recently as 
March 25, 2001, the rules of engagement in place for soldiers serving 
in the peacekeeping action in Kosovo gave specious guidance on the 
use of deadly force that required them to "shoot to wound."5 This 
order should not be surprising considering the restrictive guidelines 
given in Bosnia for NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR): "If you 
have to open fire, you must: Fire only aimed shots, and fire no more 
rounds than necessary and . . . stop firing as soon as the situation 
1st Infantry Division, Kitzingen, Germany; Operational Legal Advisor, HQ, 
IFOR/SFOR, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Deputy Chief, 
International Law and Operations Division, Office of the Judge Advocate, 
HQ, USAREUR and 7th Army, Heidelberg, Germany; Chief, Criminal and 
Administrative Law, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina; Command Judge Advocate, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and, Legal Assistance Attorney and Trial 
Defense Counsel, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 
1. See generally W. A. Stafford, How to Keep Military Personnel from Going to jail for 
Doing the Right Thing: jurisdiction, ROE & the Rules of Deadly Force, ARMY LAw., 
Nov. 2000, at 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff define the Rules of Engagement 
as "[d]irectives issued by competent military authorit[ies] which delineate 
the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will ini-
tiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." 
Id. at 3. 
2. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01A, STANDING 
RuLES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FoRCES (2000) [hereinafter SROE]; see also 
infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
3. See generally SROE, supra note 2. 
4. W. Hays Parks, Deadly Force Is Authorized, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. Jan. 2001, 
at 34, available at http:/ /www.usni.org/Proceedings/ ArticlesOl/PRO 
parksl.html ("Overly restrictive and unsuitable rules of engagement handi-
cap and endanger U.S. forces, especially ground troops on peace-support 
missions. Individual Marines, sailors, and soldiers need to know when they 
may resort to deadly force to protect their lives."). 
5. Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Military Police Embrace Kosovo Role, WASH. PosT, Mar. 
25, 2001, at A21 (quoting Staff Sergeant Jimmy Stogner about how the use 
of deadly force has been reduced to "'the five S's[:]' ... '[s]hout, shove, 
show your weapon, shoot to wound, then shoot at the "center of mass'""). 
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permits."6 Further, warning shots were permitted, even encouraged, 
and the use of deadly force against assailants fleeing an attack was not 
even covered. 7 These rules remained the same for a Peace Stabiliza-
tion Force (SFOR), as well.8 More disturbingly, many commanders 
have imposed "no rounds in the chamber" rules for perimeter security 
and patrols. 9 
It would be an understatement to say that confusion exists amongst 
commanders and judge advocates as to what constitutes a reasonable 
use of deadly force by the U.S. military and when that force is author-
ized.10 It is no wonder that commanders are left with insufficient legal 
guidance and ad hoc methods for training their troops on when and 
how to use deadly force. The United States Military, whose mission 
was once described as "to kill people and break things," 11 has a 300-
page regulation on the issuance of I.D. cards12 but lacks any specific 
guidance on the use of deadly force for its soldiers, sailors, airmen 
and Marines on world-wide deployments. 13 Mter having examined 
the proper sources upon which to base that guidance, this Article con-
cludes with a proposed appendix to the SROE on the use of deadly 
force as the benchmark mechanism with which to provide that spe-
cific guidance. 14 In light of the recent terrorist activity in this country, 
the need for clear and robust guidance is essential. 
International law, as well as the common law of the United States, 
provides ample support for the establishment of vigorous guidelines 
concerning the use of deadly force. 15 As discussed later in this Article, 
6. See OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, 2001 TJAGSA, ch. 5, app. B, 102-03 (pro-
viding sample ROE cards). 
7. Id. 
8. /d. at 104-05, see also infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
9. u.s. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, STUDENT TEXT 27-1: 
MILITARY LAw~ 3.3.III (1997), available at http:/ /www.cgsc.army.mil/nrs/ 
publications/STs/ST27-1_97 /welcome_ST27-l.html (noting that the ROE 
required to be utilized and understood by all U.S. service members of a 
Multi-National Force stated that "[w]hen on post, mobile, or foot patrol, 
keep a loaded magazine in the weapon, weapons will be on safe with no 
rounds in the chamber"). 
10. MarkS. Martins, Rules of Engagement far Land Farces: A MatterofTraining, Not 
Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REv. 3, 53 (1994) ("Commanders wrestled with the 
question of whether and how to impose the most restrictive form of ROE: 
orders dictating which soldiers are armed and have live ammunition and 
when they may chamber rounds."). 
11. Bob Wilson, The Purpose of a Military is to Kill People and Break Things, THE 
ETHICAL SPECTACLE, Feb. 1998, available at http:/ /www.spectacle.org/298/ 
wilmine.html. 
12. See AIR FoRCE INSTRUCTION 36-2907. 
13. Parks, supra note 4, at 34 (" [T]he JCS SROE is a poor document for assist-
ing an in-port ship commander or a ground force commander in inform-
ing individuals when they may use deadly force to protect themselves and 
others."); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Part V. See also infra Appendix for the authors' proposed self-
defense policy that could amend the current SROE. 
15. See infra Part liLA-B. 
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every relevant legal system in the free world makes aggression a crime 
and protects the right of self-defense.16 This right is often referred to 
as an "inherent right" or a "divine right."17 Our own federal common 
law, including many latter-day constitutional law cases concerning this 
right, strongly defines and permits a rigorous force protection 
stance.18 Judge advocates and commanders crafting rules of engage-
ment have ignored this rich source of law, which is favorable to a vig-
orous defensive posture. 
Incorporation of federal constitutional law and common law into 
the development of enhanced force protection and self-defense rules 
will only enhance our forces' ability to accomplish their missions. 
From humanitarian assistance to force-on-force conflicts, if potential 
opponents believe our forces vulnerable, the mission is compromised. 
Recurrent, hands-on tactical exercises that provide service members 
an opportunity to viscerally experience the psychological and physio-
logical dynamics of tactical encounters recognized by the law is a criti-
cal requirement for effective training. Those so trained, however, 
need clear and concise legal guidance demonstrating that both legal 
and political support is present if deadly force is used. 
II. THE PRESENT SROE USE OF DEADLY FORCE POLICY 
"The purpose of these SROE is to provide implementation gui-
dance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and 
the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense."19 So 
begins the unclassified Enclosure A to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01A. Yet, as the introduction illus-
trates, this purpose is not being served. The policy appearing on virtu-
ally every page of the SROE states that the SROE "do not limit a 
commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary 
means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of 
the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity."20 The use 
of deadly force, however, is unaccompanied by any implementation 
guidanceP In fact, the words "use of deadly force" never appear in 
the SROE,22 which begs the question- is it any wonder that confus-
ing, confounding, and dangerous tactical rules of engagement exist? 
While cognizant of the fact that some of this confusion stems from 
16. See infra Part liLA. 
17. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra Part III.B. 
19. SROE, supra note 2, encl. A, 1 l.a; see also id. 1 7 ("Enclosure A, minus 
appendixes, is UNCLASSIFIED and intended to be used as a coordination 
tool with US allies for the development of combined or multinational ROE 
consistent with these SROE."). 
20. !d. 1 2.a. 
21. See generally id.; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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improper training, without clear and unhindered rules, we may have 
fumbled before the kickoff. 
The SROE does provide some limited guidance on the use of force 
in general. It takes the form of a three-step process: ( 1) when feasible 
give a warning; (2) defend with proportionate force; and (3) attack 
when it "is the only prudent means."23 The first step, giving a warning 
when feasible, is one that is common to existing federal policies as 
appears below24 and ultimately appears in this Article's Appendix.25 
Similarly, the second tenant, proportionality, although arguably mis-
placed in a ROE document,26 is a bedrock principle of self-defense 
under both domestic and international law.27 The third step, an at-
tempt to define when the use of force is prudent, is the concern of 
this Article and therefore will be examined in greater detail. 28 
As stated, the SROE never actually address the use of deadly force. 29 
Instead, the third step is only concerned with limiting when to "attack 
to disable or destroy."30 Such an attack is permitted when it "is the 
only prudent means by which a hostile act or demonstration of hostile 
intent can be prevented or terminated."31 As a section of this Article 
on the existing Executive Branch policies regarding use of deadly 
force will discuss, this "last resort" notion permeates all policies on 
when to exercise self-defense.32 Moreover, as the probable root cause 
for "shoot to wound" and "no rounds chambered" policies seen at the 
tactical level, this "last resort" concept flies in the face of tactical reali-
ties and is inherently dangerous without a clearly defined use of 
deadly force policy. This unreasonably risky guidance should be elim-
inated from the SROE. Further, in the critical arena of self-defense, 
the SROE only are concerned with "when" to attack to destroy, but 
not with "how," again leaving many commanders to focus on the last 
resort language. 
Lastly, regarding pursuit, the SROE state that "[s]elf-defense in-
cludes the authority to pursue and engage hostile forces that continue 
to commit hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent."33 The definition of a 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
SROE, supra note 2, encl. A, ~ 8.a. 
See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of how cur-
rent ROE require U.S. troops to use both verbal warning and warning 
shots, while the DOJ policy on the use of deadly force does not require the 
agency's officers to employ either of these actions. 
See infra Appendix. 
Parks, supra note 4, at 36. ("'Minimum deadly force' is an oxymoron, as is 
'proportionate deadly force.'"). 
See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
See infra Part III.C-D. 
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
SROE, supra note 2, encl. A, ~ 8.a(3). 
!d. 
See infra Part III.C. 
SROE, supra note 2, encl. A, ~ 8.b. As defined at paragraph 5.i., a hostile 
force is one that has "committed a hostile act, exhibited hostile intent, or 
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"hostile act" or "intent" is one that is drafted to cover U.S. forces 
only.34 Compared with what is permissible under customary interna-
tional law, common law, and existing Department of justice policies,35 
this SROE language presents an unreasonable limitation on the use of 
deadly force in self-defense in pursuit situations against a "continuing 
threat." At a basic tactical level, it allows a group or individual that has 
recently demonstrated either a hostile act or intent to seek cover or a 
tactical advantage without fear of attack. An example of a recently 
demonstrated hostile act or intent occurred in Mostar, Bosnia in early 
1997 regarding a Peace Stabilization Force (SFOR).36 At a check-
point, individuals in a car fired two rocket-propelled grenades at a 
Spanish armored personnel carrier.37 The hostile actors then fled the 
scene by driving down a straight, unoccupied road.38 Despite having a 
clear shot with their .50 caliber machine gun, the Spanish unit did not 
fire because they thought the rules of engagement would no longer 
characterize the subjects as a threat. 39 
Despite these shortcomings, the SROE do provide some very funda-
mental guidance on self-defense. Some claim that by providing only 
basic information, the SROE allows for the mission-specific tailoring 
of rules for each mission. 40 Despite the simplicity and generic nature 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
has been declared hostile by appropriate US authority." /d. ~ 5.i. This use 
of "hostile force" is confounding in that once a force is declared hostile, as 
per paragraph 6, "US units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstra-
tion of hostile, [sic] intent before engaging that force." /d. ~ 6. The re-
peated use of the term "hostile force" adds to the confusion in the 
definition. Specifically, if a force is declared hostile, it is always a target. !d. 
Moreover, the notion of pursuit is not limited by a hostile force's demon-
stration of a hostile act or intent. !d. ~ 5.i. The SROE also makes any force 
that demonstrates a hostile act or intent an undeclared hostile force. /d. 
This distinction of hostile force by actions, and hostile force by declaration 
is unnecessarily confusing and frustrates the purpose of the SROE of serv-
ing as guidance and training. This terminology should be changed to clear 
up any potential confusion. "Hostile force" should be reserved for declared 
hostile forces, and all other forces that demonstrate hostile act or intent 
should be addressed precisely that way, as a force that demonstrates hostile 
act or intent. 
/d. ~ 5.g-h. There are provisions for extending the right of self-defense 
beyond U.S. forces to include U.S. nationals, U.S. property, and even for-
eign nationals, but each of these decisions are specific to the theater or 
mission, whereas the protection of U.S. forces may not be altered. /d. ~ 
8.c(1-5). 
See supra Part liLA-C. 
Interview with Lieutenant Colonel john Taylor, United States Army, in Fort 
Bragg, N.C., (May 17, 2001) (noting that these facts were based on co-au-
thor Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's firsthand account at SFOR). 
!d. 
/d. 
/d. 
SROE, supra note 2, encl. A ~ 5.a ("A commander has the authority and 
obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate 
actions to defend that commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity 
from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent."); see also Mark S. 
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of the SROE, they are often the only promulgated rules of engage-
ment for deployed forces, with very little mission-specific tailoring oc-
curring at the subordinate level as to how and when to apply force in 
self-defense.41 As eloquently stated by Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. 
Martins, much of this problem has to do with proper leadership and 
training.42 However, the failure of the SROE to squarely address the 
use of deadly force in self-defense can lead to conflicting and danger-
ous restrictions on this inherent right. Moreover, the SROE places an 
onus on commanders without the proper legal guidance by which to 
operate. 
The charge is put to commanders under the SROE that they "have 
the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective units 
understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-
defense."43 As demonstrated by the confusion at the tactical level, this 
obligation is not being met.44 An appendix to the SROE codifying the 
inherent right of self-defense45 would help end this confusion and en-
able our commanders to ensure their troops retain their inherent 
right to self-defense, rather than issuing specific ROE that unnecessa-
rily abridge that inherent right. Perhaps more importantly, clear and 
supportive guidance would give junior enlisted American military per-
sonnel, those who actually have to apply deadly force, the critical tools 
necessary to do their jobs correctly and protect themselves from the 
potential adverse consequences associated with an improper use of 
deadly force. The sources for such an appendix will now be 
addressed. 
III. SOURCES OF LAW 
A. International Recognition of the Inherent Right to Self-Defense 
The most relevant and applicable view of self-defense in interna-
tional law resides in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,46 which 
states that "[n] othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and se-
curity."47 It is important to note that Article 51 does not create the 
Martins, Deadly Force Is Authorized, But Also Trained, ARMY LAw., Sept./Oct. 
2001, at 1-2, 4. 
41. Parks, supra note 4, at 35 ("By and large, ROEs produced by the most law-
yer-heavy military in the world are cut-and-paste, copycat products lacking 
original thought or analysis and unsuitable for current missions."). 
42. Martins, supra note 40, at 16. 
43. SROE, supra note 2, encl. A,~ 5.e. This language is reiterated in paragraph 
7.d. Id. ~ 7.d. 
44. See supra notes 3-13 and accompanying text. 
45. See infra Appendix for the authors' proposed amendment to the SROE. 
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
47. Id. (emphasis added). 
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right of self-defense in international law. Rather, the Article codifies a 
pre-existing and more universal right. 
Historically, the right of self-defense has been viewed as a divine 
right in internationallaw.48 The right of self-defense in criminal law is 
one deeply rooted in the legal traditions of England,49 the source of 
most American common law.50 Almost a half millennium ago, the 
right of self-defense was expressed in the statutes of King Henry VIII 5 1 
as a complete defense to civil and criminal prosecutions. 52 The inher-
ent nature of the right of self-defense was also addressed in Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England,53 as such, "[s]elf-defense ... is 
justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be .. . 
taken away by the law of society."54 Thus, the SROE are entirely cor-
rect in proclaiming the right of self-defense as an inherent right.55 
Customary international law recognizes this right as well. The appli-
cation of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense and the maxim of a 
person's inherent right to self-defense were firmly established in the 
Caroline incident. 5 6 In 1837, the British were fighting a counter-insur-
gency war along the Niagara River in Canada. 57 The steamer Caroline 
was being utilized by the insurgents on both the American and British 
side of the river. 58 On the evening of December 29, 1837, British 
combatants crossed onto the American side of the river and destroyed 
the Caroline while it was docked in Schlosser, New York. 5 9 The Amer-
icans protested, but the British responded that they were merely exer-
cising their inherent right of self-defense.60 American Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster agreed.61 This incident is a widely cited author-
ity dealing with anticipatory self-defense, and holds that states may re-
48. See 30 CJ. Homicide§ 207 (1923); Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent 
Right of Self-Defense (a Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 
Hous.J. INT'L L. 31-32 (1987). 
49. Andrea L. Earhart, Note, Criminal Law/Self-Defense - Should a Defendant Be 
Denied the Affirmative Defense of Self-Defense If the Criminal Act Was Not Inten-
tional? Self-Defense or Defense for Self? Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 
1999), 1 Wvo. L. REv. 695, 698-99 (2001). 
50. See, e.g., Fletcher v. L.A. Trust & Sav. Bank, 187 P. 425, 427 (Cal. 1920) 
(stating that if the common law of England is not too repugnant with the 
U.S. Constitution or law of the state, English law should be followed); 
Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543 (1860) (noting that the Anlerican 
colonists brought the law of England with them when they settled). 
51. Statutes Made at Westminster, 1532, 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (Eng.). 
52. !d. 
53. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1. 
54. !d. at *4. 
55. SROE, supra note 2, encl. A, ~ 1. 
56. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MicH. L. REv. 
1620, 1634-35 (1984). 
57. 2JoHN B. MooRE, A DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAw§ 217, at 409 (1906). 
58. !d. 
59. !d. at 409-10. 
60. !d. at 410. 
61. !d. at 411. 
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sort to force even when not actually under attack if there is a 
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation."62 In addition, to be appro-
priate, self-defense must be proportional, not "unreasonable or 
excessive. "63 
Some prominent judge advocates consider the Caroline incident an 
important milestone in the recognition of the common law right of 
self-defense as it relates to international law.64 Lieutenant Com-
mander Dale Stephens wrote that: 
The 'Caroline' correspondence indicates, however, that the 
authors themselves drew upon natural law concepts and 
combined them with municipal notions of self defense as 
then understood in Anglo-American criminal law. In this re-
gard, the authors were acknowledging the personal and in-
stinctive nature of self defense. Lord Ashburton plainly 
stated in his response to Mr. Webster of 28 July 1842, that 
self defense "is the first law of our nature, and it must be 
recognized by every code which professes to regulate the 
conditions and relations of man." Further, Lord Ashburton 
was plainly aware of the novel nature of the American pro-
position that international actions may be justified by a com-
bination of the established principle of necessity and the 
national legal concept of self defense. Lord Ashburton spe-
cifically noted the "ingenious" suggestion by Mr. Webster 
that the legitimacy of British actions should be assessed by 
reference to this modified concept of self defense under in-
ternational law. Thus, the British suddenly found themselves 
defending their Captain's actions on the basis of a principle 
narrower than self-preservation. Further, Lord Ashburton 
accepted the challenge and consistently described his justifi-
cation of British actions in terms analogous to personal self 
defense.65 
Thus, international law has long recognized the right of nations to 
engage in acts - even anticipatory acts - of self-defense. A military 
unit, as an extension or arm of sovereign power, has this right. This 
long recognized right of self-defense is also strongly enunciated in our 
common law. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
29 BRITISH & FoREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840-41) (quoting Daniel 
Webster, concerning the Caroline incident). 
!d. 
Lieutenant Commander Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept 
of Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L. REv. 126, 134 (1998). 
!d. 
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B. American Common Law 
The inherent right of self-defense has been a tenant of American 
law since its beginning, 66 and it has been perpetuated throughout the 
development of America's common law. Regarding American citizens 
not in the employ of any police enforcement activity, New Orleans & 
Northeastern Railroad Co. v. ]opes, 67 stood for the idea that "the rules 
which determine what is self-defence [sic] are of universal application, 
and are not [diminished] by the character of the employment in 
which the [shooter] is engaged."68 Further, the common law did not 
call upon a man to flee rather than fight to defend himself, as illus-
trated in the case of Beard v. United States.69 In Beard, the Court stated: 
[I]f the accused ... had at the time reasonable grounds to 
believe and in good faith believed, that the deceased in-
tended to take his life or do him great bodily harm, he was 
not obliged to retreat, nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, 
but was entitled to stand his ground and meet any attack made 
upon him with a deadly weapon, in such a way and with such 
force as, under all the circumstances, he, at the moment, 
honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, 
was necessary to save his own life or to protect himself from 
great bodily injury. 70 
The right or privilege of self-defense also belongs to federal agents, 
not only civilian criminal defendants. This right exists for federal 
agents because it is necessary for them to protect themselves so they can 
accomplish their missions. 71 As said in Maryland v. Soper. 72 "Such acts of 
defense are really part of the exercise of [an Agent's] official author-
66. See U.S. CoNST. amend. II; see also Ronald S. Resnick, Private Arms as the 
Palladium of Liberty: The Meaning of the Second Amendment, 77 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REv. 1, 14 n.27 (1999) (citing several of the Founding Fathers for their 
view that the Second Amendment stands for the right to private self-
defense). 
67. 142 U.S. 18 (1891) (noting that the plaintiff, a passenger on the train, was 
shot and injured when he approached and threatened the conductor by 
wielding an open knife). 
68. /d. at 26. 
69. 158 U.S. 550, 563-64 (1895) (noting that the plaintiffs land was trespassed 
upon by three armed men who sought to steal a cow and take the plaintiffs 
life, and in an attempt to protect himself, the plaintiff struck one man 
across his head with his rifle, causing a mortal wound). 
70. /d. at 564 (emphasis added). 
71. See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 72 (1890); Reed v. Madden, 87 F.2d 846, 
852 (8th Cir. 1937); West Virginia v. Laing, 133 F. 887, 891-92 (4th Cir. 
1904); Kelly v. Georgia, 68 F. 652 (S.D. Ga. 1895); Ramsey v. Jailer, 20 F. 
Cas. 214 (D. Ky. 1879) (No. 11,547); U.S. v. Jailer, 26 F. Cas. 571, 576 
(C.C.D. Ky. 1867) (No. 15,463). 
72. 270 U.S. 9 (1926) (noting that this case concerned a petition for a writ of 
mandamus to remand an indictment for the murder of four probation 
agents). 
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ity. They are necessary to make the enforcement effective."73 Simi-
larly, U.S. military forces abroad are not only unreasonably put in 
jeopardy, but are unnecessarily hamstrung in accomplishing their mis-
sions if not allowed to adequately defend themselves. 
Common law does not require one to delay in considering non-le-
thal responses to an immediate threat of deadly force. 74 Nor is one 
required to shoot to wound or give warning.75 In light ofthe clarity of 
the law of self-defense on this point, it is astounding that many judge 
advocates write into operational unit ROE, or incorporate into train-
ing requirements, that service members must reflect or consider lesser 
alternatives when confronted with deadly force. 76 The words of the 
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United States,77 are particu-
larly persuasive on this point: 
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of 
an uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a 
condition of immunity that one in that situation should 
pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think 
it possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant[, or to 
consider other alternatives,] rather than to kill him. 78 
Lastly, concerning the use of deadly force, the Supreme Court has 
levied their judgment on the criteria for analyzing an officer's deci-
sion to use deadly force. In Graham v. Connor,79 utilizing a Fourth 
Amendment analysis,80 the Court ruled that "[t]he 'reasonableness' 
inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is 
whether the officer's actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the 
73. Id. at 42. 
74. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
75. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
76. MARINE CoRPs Ass'N, GuiDEBOOK FOR MARINES 74-75 (17th ed. 1997) ("Ap-
plication of deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme ne-
cessity and only as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot 
reasonably be employed."). 
77. 256 U.S. 335 (1921) (noting that the defendant shot and killed the assail-
ant, who had repeatedly struck the defendant with a knife). 
78. Id. at 343; see also United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (recognizing that there is no duty to retreat from an assault produc-
ing imminent danger); United States v. Yabut, 43 C.M.R. 233, 234 (CMA 
1971); Marche' v. Parrachak, No. 1998-CV-4219, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14804, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2000); Glashen v. Godshall, 95 Civ. 4481 
(WHP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17698, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1999); Silas v. 
Bowen, 277 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D.S.C. 1967) (stating that use of a deadly 
weapon as self-defense is justified if a reasonable person would anticipate 
serious bodily harm). 
79. 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (noting that police officers violently arrested the plain-
tiff, not knowing that the plaintiff was suffering from a diabetic attack). 
80. Under the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court looks at the overall ap-
propriateness of the law enforcement seizure rather than self-defense 
alone. 
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facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their un-
derlying intent or motivation."81 Further, the Court stated that: 
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight .... 
"Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unneces-
sary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth 
Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody 
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to 
make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving- about the amount of 
force that is necessary in a particular situation. 82 
In the federal policies on the use of deadly force in self-defense, 
discussed below, the "objective reasonableness" standard of Graham, 
has become the consensus standard by which to judge an individual's 
use of force. 83 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the use of 
deadly force in apprehending a fleeing felon in Tennessee v. Gamer.84 
Therein, the Court created the fleeing suspect rule and held that: 
[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there 
is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to pre-
vent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been 
given.85 
The Ninth Circuit further expounded on this fleeing subject rule in 
Forrett v. Richardson86 in holding that "the suspect need not be armed 
or pose an immediate threat to officers or others at the time of the 
shooting."87 Existing federal law enforcement policies, however, limit 
the court's fleeing felon rule.88 
Some advocates may assert that the common law, as well as latter-
day Fourth Amendment cases, have no relevance to the analysis of the 
81. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
82. /d. at 396-97 (citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 
1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
83. See infra Part III.C. 
84. 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (noting that a police officer shot and killed a fleeing 
burglary suspect, even though the officer was "reasonably sure" the suspect 
was unarmed). 
85. Id. at 11-12; see also Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that an officer shot a fleeing motorist who posed danger to the 
officers and others during a vehicle pursuit). 
86. 112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the use of deadly force was rea-
sonable on a suspect the officers believed to be armed and who would not 
halt when requested to do so by the police). 
87. Id. at 420. 
88. See infra Part III.C. 
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use of deadly force in the military.89 However, the common law al-
ready has relevance in the application of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice.90 The instructions found in Department of the Army 
Pamphlet 27-9, The Military judge's Benchbook, concerning use of deadly 
force in self-defense, mirror the common law.91 
C. Existing Policy in the Executive Branch 
On October 16, 1995, the Departments of Justice and Treasury is-
sued new policies on the use of deadly force. 92 Revelations from the 
congressional hearings on the Ruby Ridge shootings where federal 
agents were under special orders that snipers "could and should" fire 
at any armed adult male spotted outside Randy Weaver's cabin 
spurred the new policy.93 The policy brought under its purview the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service, the 
Bureau of Prisons, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the 
Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, and the Cus-
toms Service and remains in effect today. Considering the often anal-
ogous situation between federal agents and service members 
conducting peace enforcement, peace keeping, humanitarian inter-
vention, and non-combatant evacuation operations, the rules under 
which other federal officers operate, while not binding, certainly offer 
one source from which to formulate use of deadly force appendix to 
the SROE.94 
Unfortunately, the DoD has ignored both federal common law and 
constitutional decisions concerning the use of deadly force in its de-
velopment of the SROE and tactical ROE. Meanwhile, the DOJ com-
mentary to their deadly force policy expressly acknowledges such case 
law in developing the policy for federal officers.95 Indeed, the DOJ 
states in the introduction to the commentary that, "[i] n developing 
the policy, it became apparent that decisional law provides only lim-
89. Parks, supra note 4, at 35 ("Military and DoD civilian lawyers have eschewed 
federal case law relating to law enforcement use of deadly force because of 
the natural (and correct) reluctance to involve the military in domestic law 
enforcement, failing to distinguish between applying it and using its re-
sources for assistance."). 
90. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 18502 (1994). 
91. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-9, MILITARY JuDGE'S BENCHBOOK, 5-2-1 to 
5-2-6 (stating that there must be "a reasonable belief that death or grievous 
bodily harm was about to be inflicted ... "). 
92. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, MEMORANDUM UNIFORM DEP'T OF JusTICE (Oct. 16, 
1995); see also 58 CrL 2001, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE PoLICY ON UsE OF DEADLY 
FoRCE, vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct. 25, 1995). 
93. Marcy Gordon, Administration Adopts New Shooting Policy, AssoCIATED PREss, 
Oct. 18, 1995. 
94. See generally Stafford, supra note 1 (arguing the importance of factoring lo-
cal jurisdictions' rules on the use of deadly force when sending service 
members on law enforcement missions). 
95. U.S. DEP'T oF JusTICE, CoMMENTARY REGARDING THE UsE OF DEADLY FoRCE 
IN NoN-CUSTODIAL SITUATIONS, n. 1 (Oct. 17, 1995). 
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ited guidance regarding the use of deadly force. In addition, as a mat-
ter of principle, the Department deliberately did not formulate this 
policy to authorize force up to constitutional or other legal limits. "96 
The DOJ has therefore opted for a more restrictive authority based on 
its judgment of what a prudent policy should instruct. 
The commentary to the policy establishes that "the touchstone of 
the Department's policy regarding the use of deadly force is neces-
sity."97 As the policy, commentary, and the FBI's Training Guide to 
the Deadly Force Policy explain, the necessity to use deadly force 
hinges on two factors: ( 1) " [ t] he presence of an imminent danger" of 
death or serious physical injury to the agents or others, and (2) no 
safe alternative to using such force exist.98 The criteria for evaluating 
an officer's judgment of what constitutes necessity is based explicitly 
on Graham v. Connor,99 which is common to the policies of DoD law 
enforcement agencies as wel1. 100 
Regarding fleeing felons, the DOJ policy has fairly specific guidance 
that is more restrictive than what case law allows. 101 Though Tennessee 
v. Gamer, 102 the governing case on fleeing felons, does not require 
that the felon pose an immediate threat before deadly force is author-
ized, the DOJ policy does. 103 This presents an intriguing situation 
whereby a federal agent may be found to be in compliance under the 
Fourth Amendment, but still in violation of his Agency's policy. The 
second element below makes the DOJ policy more restrictive: 
Deadly force may be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing 
subject if there is probable cause to believe: (1) the subject 
has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of serious physical injury or death, and (2) the es-
96. !d. (footnotes omitted). The commentary continues: 
!d. 
97. !d. 
Courts would step outside their proper role if they formulated de-
tailed policies with respect to the procedures governing deadly 
force; in contrast, the Department has the discretion to determine 
what the policy should be and to provide guidance to its employees 
with regard to these solemn issues. Cases arise in procedural pos-
tures - typically civil tort or civil rights actions, or motions to dis-
miss or overturn criminal charges or convictions - in which a 
wrongful act on the part of the government may not lead to recov-
ery or sanctions. As a result the court often does not reach the 
question of whether the use of force was wrongful. 
98. See jOHN C. HALL, FBI TRAINING ON THE NEw FEDERAL DEADLY FoRCE Poucv 
'li III.B (1996) (noting that Mr. Hall, who teaches in the FBI Academy's 
Legal Instruction Unit, is regarded as a leading expert on the law relating 
to deadly force). 
99. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
100. See infra Part III.D. 
101. See supra notes 84-88 for a discussion of the fleeing suspect rule. 
102. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
103. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTicE, MEMORANDUM ON REsoLuTioN 14 'li LA (Oct. 17, 
1995). 
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cape of the subject would pose an imminent danger of death 
or serious physical injury to the officer or to another 
person. 104 
Similarly, there may be situations in which a soldier, sailor, airman 
or Marine may be constrained by a policy not to fire on an otherwise 
dangerous subject. 105 Such situations, however, should be the tactical 
exception rather than the rule, and should be solely within the unfet-
tered purview of leaders at the absolute lowest levels. Moreover, the 
constraining policy imposed should not result in an unnecessary risk 
to the service member. This is not, as some suggest, a usurpation of 
military authority. 106 It should be remembered that military leaders 
have the authority to order subordinates to "take that hill," but not 
the right to order them to charge with fixed bayonets when machine 
guns are available. 107 
Safe alternatives are considered when determining whether deadly 
force should be utilized, and the DO] has outlined their parameters 
very clearly. Unlike the mandatory "Stani Ili Pucam!' (Stop or I will 
fire), in the IFOR and SFOR ROE, 108 verbal warnings are not required 
where they would pose a risk to the officer or others.109 Yet another 
concern is the availability of cover: deadly force may still be necessary 
where the felon can find or is seeking tactical cover. 110 As illustrated 
by Tennessee v. Garner, 111 a dangerous individual can represent a con-
tinuing threat, despite the seemingly non-threatening actions of a sub-
ject fleeing the scene.U2 
The DO] policy boldly prohibits two commonly recognized alterna-
tives: warning shots and shooting to wound. The policy states that 
"[w]arning shots are not permitted outside of the prison context."113 
As the commentary explains, "[d]ischarge of a firearm is usually con-
sidered to be permissible only under the same circumstances when 
deadly force may be used - that is, only when necessary to prevent loss 
of life or serious physical injury. Warning shots themselves may pose 
dangers to the officer or others."114 As for the propriety of shooting 
to disable or shooting to wound, the commentary flatly bans such a 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
llO. 
lll. 
l12. 
l13. 
l14. 
!d. 
Examples of these situations are as follows: (1) an armed subject is hiding 
amongst a crowd of unarmed noncombatants, or, (2) returning fire would 
provoke a more dangerous response. Just as in civilian law enforcement 
settings, the authority to fire does not mean a service member must fire. 
Public Discussions at the XVIII Airborne Corps' Joint Rules of Engagement 
Conference, Fort Bragg, N.C. (May 17-18, 2001). 
!d. 
See supra notes 4-8, 36-39 and accompanying text. 
U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE MEMORANDUM, supra note 103, III. 
HALL, supra note 98 , III.B.2.b. 
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE MEMORANDUM, supra note 103 , IV. 
U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE COMMENTARY, supra note 95. 
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practice: "Attempts to shoot to wound or to injure are unrealistic and, 
because of high miss rates and poor stopping effectiveness, can prove 
dangerous for the officer and others. Therefore, shooting merely to 
disable is strongly discouraged."II 5 Although federal law enforcement 
agencies have already recognized and banned the practice of shooting 
to wound, this ineffective and dangerous practice is perpetuated by 
the orders given to our troops in the BalkansY 6 More disturbing are 
rules requiring servicemen deployed in hostile fire or hazardous duty 
zones to patrol with unloaded side arms. 117 This practice flows from 
commanders' misunderstanding of the level of force allowed by the 
law, inadequate training, and an irrational fear that shooting some-
one, even if proper, will somehow lead to mission failure. 
Once an individual has made the decision to open fire, the next 
question is for how long can he continue to fire. Again, in contrast to 
IFOR and SFOR ROE, a federal agent is not required to shoot once 
and then stopY8 Instead, he is to continue firing until the subject 
surrenders or no longer poses an imminent threat.II 9 This determi-
nation, rather than the number of rounds fired, is a more accurate 
measure of proportionality. Further, under the stressful conditions of 
a deadly force encounter, it is unrealistic and tactically unsound to 
require the counting of rounds. 
D. Use of Deadly Force According to DoD 
Somewhat surprisingly, a DoD policy does exist on the use of deadly 
force. 120 Unfortunately, it only relates to the performance of law en-
forcement and related security duties rather than to ROE for the 
force as a whole. 121 Originating in 1992, it evolved in 1997, and ma-
tured to its most recent version as of November 2001: Department of 
Defense Directive 5 210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by 
DoD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties. 122 
This Directive authorizes DoD personnel to carry firearms while en-
gaging in law enforcement or security duties, protecting personnel, 
vital government assets, or guarding prisoners. 123 The recent changes 
to this Directive, in the wake of September 11th, set forth rules for 
115. Jd. 
116. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that this practice often 
comes more from a commander's fear of unintended firearms' discharges 
than any tactical consideration). 
118. Compare OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 102-03, with HALL, 
supra note 98 ~ IV.A. 
119. HALL, supra note 98 ~ IV.A. 
120. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
121. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
122. U.S. DEP'T oF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5210.56, UsE oF DEADLY FoRcE AND THE 
CARRYING OF FIREARMS BY DoD PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN LAw ENFORCEMENT 
AND SECURITY DUTIES (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter DODD 5210.56]. 
123. Jd. ~ 2.2 
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armed travel aboard commercial aircraft.124 To its credit, the new pol-
icy attempts to better comport with the DO] Deadly Force Policy, as 
well as specifically barring the use of warning shots. 125 Unfortunately, 
the new DODD 5210.56 retains some confusing language concerning 
what constitutes "serious bodily harm."126 Serious bodily harm is "not 
... a black eye or a bloody nose, but [it] does include fractured or 
dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious dam-
age to the internal organs, and other life-threatening injuries."127 
While attempting to illustrate what constitutes "necessity," such lan-
guage may actually place DoD law enforcement personnel in danger 
by giving them the mistaken belief that they must first suffer less than 
"serious physical harm" before resorting to the use of deadly force 
against an otherwise dangerous subject. 
In a tactical military setting, this issue becomes more apparent. An-
yone who attacks an openly armed soldier becomes a de Jacto128 and de 
junf29 threat, and deadly force is authorized. A physical attack against 
an armed service member in which that service member's weapon 
may be taken by the attacker and used with deadly effect against either 
the service member or his/her fellow service members is, in effect, a 
use of deadly force. One refusing to recognize this fact is either 
uneducable or silendy stating that the assailant's life is more impor-
tant than the uniformed service member's life. 
There are many other activities, such as manning traffic control 
points or guarding a ship in port, when the carrying of loaded side 
arms would be prudent and warranted. Usually, this would occur in a 
deployed environment. Therein lies the impotence and irrelevance 
of DODD 5210.56, for it does not apply, "to DoD personnel engaged 
in military operations and subject to authorized rules of engage-
ment."130 It is precisely in such situations where most DoD personnel 
will need such guidance and where such guidance is lacking. 
Lasdy, amongst judge advocates and commanders, there is great 
confusion over what "use proportionate force" means.131 DODD 
5210.56 adds to this confusion by stating that "[i]n such cases where 
the use of force is warranted, DoD personnel shall use the minimum 
amount of force necessary to reach their objective."132 The require-
124. Id. encl. 3. 
125. ld. encl. 2, ~ 1.6.1. 
126. See id. ~ 3.6. 
127. !d. This is the same language found in the Manual for Courts-Martial (2000), 
paragraph 54.c(4) (a), for its definition of "grievous bodily harm." 
128. BlACK's LAw DICriONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999) (noting that "de facto" means 
"existing in fact"). 
129. Id. (noting that "dejun!' means "[e]xisting by right or according to law"). 
130. DODD 5210.56, supra note 122, ~ 2.3. 
131. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
132. DODD 5210.56, supra note 122 ~ 4.2 (emphasis added). 
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ment to use "minimum force" does not appear in the SROE. 133 Fur-
ther, the Law of Armed Conflict (or the Law of War) only requires 
proportional force to be used. Yet troops are regularly briefed that 
this is how they are to defend themselves - not with proportionate force, 
not to eliminate the threat, but with minimum force. 134 In addition to 
the political pressures for no conflict or casualties, this language is 
briefed perhaps due to commanders' or judge advocates' underesti-
mation of troops' capacity to appreciate proportionality. In other 
words, troops are briefed to use "minimum force" in self-defense as a 
shorthand measure in an effort to preclude "excessive force." How-
ever, as Colonel W. Hays Parks (Ret.) has pithily, but quite accurately, 
proclaimed: "Minimum deadly force is an oxymoron."135 The pro-
posed Appendix seeks to eradicate this potentially life-threatening ad-
vice for troops operating under the SROE.136 
IV. THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE APPENDIX TO THE SROE 
While the proposed Appendix has its roots in the U.S. Constitution 
and American common law, 137 it is also consistent with customary in-
ternational law and the underpinnings of the U.N. Charter.138 Both 
the DO] Deadly Force Policy and DODD 5210.56 are similarly based 
on federal case law. 139 Because service members take an oath of alle-
giance to the Constitution of the United States, such roots are not 
misplaced. 
The trigger for the use of deadly force is necessity. A service mem-
ber's decision to open fire will be evaluated by the legal standard of 
"objective reasonableness," as explained by Graham v. Connor. 140 
The term "imminent" retains the elastic definition found in the 
commentary to the DOJ policy. 141 It includes the situation where the 
individual suspected of threatening or in fact inflicting serious bodily 
harm remains a valid target for self-defense if he is heading for cover 
or where a weapon may be reasonably available to him. 142 
The requirement of a verbal warning is maintained at the "feasible" 
level: one is only required if it does not endanger the service member 
or others. 143 Further, the evaluation of the assailant's reaction as dis-
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
139. 
140. 
141. 
142. 
143. 
See SROE, supra note 2. 
U.S. ARMY CENTER FOR LAw AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, RuLES OF ENGAGE-
MENT HANDBOOK FORjUDGE ADVOCATES, apps. B-C (2000). 
Parks, supra note 4, at 36. 
See infra Appendix. 
See supra Part III.B. 
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
See supra Part III.C-D. 
See infra Appendix 'l[ 3.b. See also supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Graham. 
See infra Appendix 'l[ 3.c; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
See infra Appendix 'l[ 3.c; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
See infra Appendix 'l[ 5.a.1. 
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cussed in the FBI's Training Guide is also adopted: if the assailant 
complies, then no shot is allowed; if the assailant resists or ignores the 
warning, then shots are still authorized. 144 This concept of allowing 
for a verbal warning must remain in proper perspective. It should not 
be a requirement, but only a desirable attempt, if feasible. The IFOR/ 
SFOR ROE requirement to warn in the host nation's languages would 
be altered to include the words "if feasible." The absurdity of making 
verbal warnings a requirement- speaking a foreign language clearly 
enough to be understood in a high stress and noisy environment -
merely increases the exposure of our young service members to more 
Monday morning quarterbacking. 
Hopefully, the confusion on warning shots and "shoot to wound" 
will be put to rest by the Appendix - both are expressly prohibited by 
the Appendix for most ground force applications. 145 As case law, DOJ 
policy, and DODD 5210.56 all recognize, these practices violate the 
governing principle of the SROE, to wit: commanders should not di-
minish their troops right of self-defense.146 Tactical and law enforce-
ment experience has shown that these practices only serve to 
endanger officers and service members, and they should rightly be 
banned. The Appendix also addresses these issues. 147 
V. CONCLUSION 
During the past decade, the U.S. military has changed its mission 
from one of "killing people and breaking things"148 to "healing peo-
ple and building things, but be prepared to kill people and break 
things, too." Prior to September 11, 2001, these recent missions 
caused uncertainty amongst commanders as to what levels of force 
may be used in self-defense.149 Now, new and clarified rules are re-
quired. If and when forces are declared hostile, there is no concern 
for when a serviceman fires, how long, or how often he fires, so long 
as it is directed at the enemy. But in today's world, the "enemy" is not 
such a clear-cut target. 150 Instead, our troops are deployed on 
counter-terrorist, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and security assis-
tance missions. 151 What decisions are we to expect of our service 
144. See infra Appendix 1 5.a.1; see also HALL, supra note 98. 
145. See infra Appendix 1 5.a.2-3. 
146. See supra Part III.B-D. 
147. See irifTa Appendix 1 5.a.2-3. 
148. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
149. Richard Dowden, US Soldiers Massacred 1,000 Somalis in Panic, THE Os. 
SERVER, Mar. 22, 1998, available at 1998 WL 6626517 (noting that in the 
confusion and panic of combat, U.S. soldiers abandoned their rules of en-
gagement, and elevated their use of force). 
150. Id. (noting that hostile forces in Somalia often hid among crowds of 
civilians). 
151. Paul Quinn:Judge, US to 'Stay the Course' in Somalia, BosTON GLOBE, available 
at 1993 WL 6606336 (noting that in Somalia, U.S. forces engaged in 
counter-terrorism, security, humanitarian, and peacekeeping missions). 
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members when no armed conflict exists, yet they are threatened and 
attacked by hostile host nationals either pointing firearms or attacking 
with clubs? Our troops need proper guidance and training so that 
they are not further endangered by the SROE and its progeny found 
in tactical ROE and ROE cards. 152 The Use of Deadly Force Appendix 
proposed by this Article provides that guidance. It will clear up the 
confusion, give commanders the political support they deserve, and it 
will protect our troops' right of self-defense. 
When confronted with the proposal of adding a deadly force policy 
to our SROE that is similar to the DO] policy, many have voiced a 
concern that this will impair our warfighting capability by causing 
young troops to hesitate when ordered to fire at a declared combatant 
in a traditional force on force environment. This argument is without 
merit for two reasons. First, it assumes that personnel are incapable of 
following orders to switch from one rule to another (an assumption 
belied by both practical experience and the routine use of phased 
ROE in battle planning). Secondly, the alternative as it now stands -
commanders prohibiting individuals to lock and load magazines for 
fear of unintended discharges or, as happens throughout the SFOR 
theater, sending Army CID personnel to investigate every discharge of 
a firearm - in no way can be viewed as inculcating a warrior mentality. 
The authors recognize the inherent tension that exists between op-
erators and policy makers. Too often, just as in law enforcement bu-
reaucracies, policy makers are more concerned about liability, and 
not enough about survivability. As uniformed judge advocates, how-
ever, we should concern ourselves with enhancing our commands' 
survivability within the parameters of the law. 
152. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE A 
SELF-DEFENSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
ON THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 
1. Purpose and Scope 
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a. This appendix establishes policies and procedures and provides 
SROE (additional to those in Enclosure A) governing the use of 
deadly force by US forces to defend the United States, US forces, US 
nationals and their property, US commercial assets, and designated 
non-US forces against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. To 
provide uniform training and planning capabilities, this document is 
authorized for distribution to commanders at all levels and is to be 
used as fundamental guidance for training and directing their forces. 
b. Except as augmented by supplemental ROE for specific opera-
tions, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures established 
herein remain in effect until rescinded. 
c. US forces operating with multinational forces: US forces always 
retain the right to use necessary and proportional force, including the 
use of deadly force, for unit and individual self-defense in response to 
a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. 
d. Commanders of US forces subject to international agreements 
governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g. Status of Forces 
Agreements) retain the inherent authority and obligation to use all 
necessary means available and take all appropriate actions, including 
the use of deadly force, for unit self-defense. 
e. US forces in support of operations not under OPCON or 
TACON of a US CINC or that are performing missions under direct 
control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other-USC departments 
or agencies (e.g. Marine Security Guards, certain special security 
forces) retain the authority and obligation to use all necessary means 
available and to take all appropriate actions, including the use of 
deadly force, in unit self-defense in accordance with this appendix to 
these SROE. 
f. DoD units operating under USCG OPCON or TACON retain 
the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and 
to take all appropriate actions, including the use of deadly force, in 
unit self-defense in accordance with this appendix to these SROE. 
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2. Policy. As established in Enclosure A and this appendix, these 
rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obliga-
tion to use all necessary means and to take all appropriate actions, 
including the use of deadly force, in self-defense of the com-
mander's unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity. 
3. Definitions 
a. Deadly Force. Tbe use of any force that a person knows or should 
know would create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily 
harm. 
b. Reasonable Belief. Facts and circumstances, including the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom, known to the person at the time of 
the use of deadly force, that would cause a reasonable person to con-
clude that probable cause exists to take immediate action. Probable 
cause does not mean that the outcome is more likely than not to oc-
cur, only that the likelihood of occurrence is sufficient to prompt a 
reasonably cautious person to take action. The reasonableness of a 
belief or decision must be viewed from the perspective of the person 
on the scene, who may often be forced to make split-second decision 
in circumstances that are tense, unpredictable, and rapidly evolving. 
Reasonableness is not to be viewed from the calm vantage point of 
hindsight. 
c. Imminent. Involving a period of time dependent on the circum-
stances of an individual situation, rather than the fixed point of time 
implicit in the concept of "immediate" or "instantaneous." Thus, a 
subject may pose an imminent danger even if he or she is not, at that 
very moment, pointing a weapon at an U.S. unit or service member. 
For example, if a subject who has demonstrated a hostile act or intent 
has a weapon within reach, or is running for cover carrying a weapon, 
or is running to a place where the U.S. service member has reason to 
believe a weapon is available, that subject may pose an imminent 
threat. 
4. Authority to Use Deadly Force. Deadly force may be employed under 
one or more of these circumstances: 
a. Self-Defense and Defense of Others. Individuals may use deadly 
force, when the individual reasonably believes himself or other U.S. 
personnel, units, or friendly forces in the vicinity to be in imminent 
danger of death or serious physical harm. 
b. Assets Involving National Security. When it appears reasonably 
necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to na-
tional security. DoD assets shall be specifically designated as "vital to 
national security" only when their loss, damage, or compromise would 
seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. Ex-
amples include nuclear weapons; nuclear command, control, and 
communications facilities; and designated restricted areas containing 
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strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special access 
programs. 
c. Assets Not Involving National Security But Inherently Dangerous to 
Others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to pre-
vent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as operable weap-
ons or ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., 
assets that, in the hands of an unauthorized individual, present a sub-
stantial threat of death or serious physical harm to others. Examples 
include high-risk portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, including 
individual or crew served small arms, ammunition, explosives, chemi-
cal agents, and special nuclear material. 
5. Action in Use of Deadly Force 
a. Means of Self-Defense. All necessary means available and all ap-
propriate actions may be used when employing deadly force for self-
defense. The following apply for individual, unit, national, or collec-
tive self-defense: 
1) Verbal Warning. If feasible and if doing so would not increase 
the danger to the individual or U.S. personnel, units, or other friendly 
forces in the vicinity, give a verbal waming prior to the use of deadly 
force. Failure to heed a verbal waming may be considered as a threat 
indicator. 
2) Warning Shots. General Rule: Waming shots by ground forces are 
prohibited. Exception: A ground commander, at any level of com-
mand, may, on a case-by-case basis, order the use of warning shots if 
such use does not place members of his command at greater risk of 
death or serious physical harm, and to do so would not place innocent 
bystanders, at greater risk of death or serious physical harm 
3) Discharge of a Firearm. When a firearm is discharged, it will be 
fired with the intent of rendering the individual or group posing a 
threat of death or serious physical harm incapable of continuing to do 
so. In other words the intent will be to stop the conduct that poses a 
threat of death or serious physical injury. Orders to "shoot to wound," 
or words to that effect, are prohibited. 
b. Pursuit of Hostile Forces. Pursuit and use of deadly force is au-
thorized when it reasonably appears necessary to detain or prevent the 
escape of a person who is believed to have posed an imminent threat 
of death or serious physical injury to U.S. personnel, units, or other 
friendly forces in the vicinity (as defined in para 4a), stolen or at-
tempted to steal National Security Assets (as defined in para 4b), or 
stolen or attempted to steal assets inherently dangerous to others (as 
defined in para 4c), and it reasonably appears that the individual 
poses an imminent or continuing threat of death or serious physical 
injury to U.S. personnel, units, or other friendly forces in the vicinity. 
